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Abstract
The maintenance of disease-free status from Foot-and-Mouth Disease is of significant socio-economic importance to
countries such as the UK. The imposition of bans on the movement of susceptible livestock following the discovery of an
outbreak is deemed necessary to prevent the spread of what is a highly contagious disease, but has a significant economic
impact on the agricultural community in itself. Here we consider the risk of applying movement restrictions only in localised
zones around outbreaks in order to help evaluate how quickly nation-wide restrictions could be lifted after notification. We
show, with reference to the 2001 and 2007 UK outbreaks, that it would be practical to implement such a policy provided the
basic reproduction ratio of known infected premises can be estimated. It is ultimately up to policy makers and stakeholders
to determine the acceptable level of risk, involving a cost benefit analysis of the potential outcomes, but quantifying the risk
of spread from different sized zones is a prerequisite for this. The approach outlined is relevant to the determination of
control zones and vaccination policies and has the potential to be applied to future outbreaks of other diseases.
Citation: Schley D, Gubbins S, Paton DJ (2009) Quantifying the Risk of Localised Animal Movement Bans for Foot-and-Mouth Disease. PLoS ONE 4(5): e5481.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005481
Editor: Michael B. Gravenor, University of Swansea, United Kingdom
Received February 13, 2009; Accepted April 1, 2009; Published May 8, 2009
Copyright:  2009 Schley et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was funded by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council [IAH1320]. www.bbsrc.ac.uk. The funders had no role in study
design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: David.Schley@bbsrc.ac.uk
Introduction
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) remains of enormous socio-
economic importance, both in disease-free countries and where it
is endemic. Due to its highly contagious nature and economic
importance, FMD is the first disease for which the OIE (World
Organisation for Animal Health) lists a country’s status. In
addition to the impact of FMD on animal welfare and
productivity, the loss of disease-free status results in costly trade
restrictions. Its economic impact – as witnessed in the UK in 2001
(Thompson et al., 2002) - is considered sufficient to justify stringent
control measures including the implementation of a stamping-out
policy with culling of animals on infected farms and, in certain
circumstances, where infection is suspected rather than confirmed.
An important part of any containment and eradication policy is
the imposition of movement restrictions for susceptible livestock.
There was severe criticism of the delay in February 2001 in
bringing this into effect within the UK, with analysis (Ferguson et
al., 2001), (Woolhouse et al., 2001) showing that a significant
reduction in the basic reproduction ratio of infected premises (IPs)
was achieved following the imposition of a national movement
ban, in part due to the initial widespread and undiagnosed
transmission - the ‘‘silent spread’’ period (Anderson, 2002); we
define the basic reproduction ratio as the number of new IPs per
existing IP.
Such a policy has major practical and economic implications.
The inability to take livestock to market or slaughter at an
appropriate time incurs direct and indirect losses: in 2001 a
significant proportion of animals - at least two and a half million
out of more than six and a half million (Haydon et al., 2004) - were
culled for welfare reasons, after being stranded on farms without
appropriate food and facilities, rather than because of evidence of
infection. Losses estimated at £100 million (National-Farmers’-
Union, 2007) resulted from national restrictions imposed in
response to an FMD outbreak in 2007 in the UK that was
contained at a relatively local level (Defra, 2007b), dwarfing the
£1.5 m estimated to have been lost by those farms directly
involved (National-Farmers’-Union, 2008). It is therefore appro-
priate to ask whether such stringent restrictions are necessary in
parts of the country at a significant distance from affected areas or
if it is possible to consider a regional policy instead.
In the European Union (EU) the minimum size for a Control
Zone (CZ) around any FMD outbreak is 10 km radius, comprising
an intensively monitored inner Protection Zone (PZ) of at least 3 km
radius and an outer Surveillance Zone (SZ) (Anonymous, 2003).
Regionalisation, whereby movement restrictions are enforced more
widely is also recommended where FMDV appears to be spreading
despite the imposition of other measures (Anonymous, 2003). Here,
we evaluate regionalisation and the imposition of a Restriction Zone
(RZ) around any IP and its obligatory CZ. At present we do not
consider the imposition of any additional measures in such zones
beyond the maintenance of a ban on the movement of susceptible
animals after it has been lifted nationally.
Given the potential for rapid spread in unrestricted areas we
focus on the risk of the disease escaping any imposed RZ: that is,
spreading to a premise outside the zone. Only by quantifying this
risk is it possible to evaluate the economic benefits of being able to
trade animals (and take them to slaughter) against the significant
costs of the disease spreading faster and further; commensurately,
we acknowledge that this analysis can only be applied in the
context of an economic understanding.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e5481Results
Figure 1 shows the required radius for a RZ containing I IPs with
mean reproduction ratio R0 to maintain the risk of escape (infection
of premises outside of the RZ) from primary transmission below 1%.
Secondary transmissions can be included but have a relatively small
effect on the required radius for realistic values of R0.
The risk of escape increases exponentially with IR0 so that the
policy decision of what risk level is deemed acceptable will quickly
determine whether local RZs are appropriate. An epidemic of the
size of that experienced in the UK in 2001 - totalling over 2000 IPs
and peaking at over 50 reported cases per day [1,2] - would
generate sufficiently large and dispersed RZs for regionalisation
not to be a practical option until considerably later in the
outbreak.
The 2007 outbreak of FMD in the UK began with a small
cluster of two IPs [3] that triggered a national movement ban and
the imposition of a 10 km Control Zone [4], , in accordance with
EU regulations [5],. Shortly after restrictions where lifted a second
cluster of IPs was found [6], resulting in their reinstatement,
although it is clear that transmission occurred between farms while
the movement band was still in place [7,8]. Assuming the original
IPs had a mean reproduction ratio of R0~1:4 (equivalent to the
situation in the UK on 24th February 2001 [9] after restrictions
had been put in place) the predicted risk of escape from a 10 km
RZ is 13%: for a risk of less than 1% a RZ of 40 km would have
been required. Exactly what level of risk is acceptable will depend
upon a cost-benefit analysis of relaxed restrictions versus the
consequences of further outbreaks.
For a risk of further escape from the second cluster of below 1%
a 67 km RZ would have been required, but this encompasses the
first cluster which – if still considered a risk (due to incomplete
tracing for example) – would have required a combined RZ of
77 km. An acceptable risk of only 0.1% dramatically increases the
RZ sizes required, to 120 km (initially) and 229 km (following the
second cluster); the various RZs are shown in Figure 2. Although
such a precautionary approach rapidly results in the imposition of
a movement ban over a large area, it is also true that a substantial
proportion of the country remains unrestricted. For comparison
we note that in response to the bluetongue outbreak in the UK a
150 km Protection Zone was established out of which untested-
animal movements were not allowed [10].
The sensitivity of the RZ radius, r, to changes in the
transmission kernel parameters a and c, was evaluated by
calculating changes in the RZ radius for values of the parameters
in their 95% confidence intervals. Changes in the radius, r, with
respect to a and c, are proportional to log IR0 ðÞ resulting in a
maximum increase (decrease) in the RZ radius required for
IR0~40 of 34% (24%). In terms of the 2007 clusters, the fitted
model has a confidence interval of: (26 km, 63 km) for a 40 km
RZ; and of (48 km, 132 km) for a 77 km zone. As discussed in the
main section, results are highly sensitive to the choice of acceptable
risk Hi, which is the main determinant of the RZ radius.
Discussion
The evaluation of RZs should always be supplementary to
primary risk appraisal involving the tracing of animal movements,
known trade routes and other infection pathways from an IP. The
automatic imposition of a nationwide movement ban - long
enough to cover the ‘‘silent spread’’ period [11] - is necessary in
order for this to be carried out and prevent further spread,
although potential but unconfirmed locations could always be
included in any RZ analysis as a precaution. During this time an
assessment of the likely basic reproductive ratio of any cluster of
IPs could be made, which would be dependent not only on the
virus strain but also on regional factors such as farm-types and
densities. Previous studies e.g. [9] have calculated significantly
different R0 values for different regions during an outbreak,
including the generation of R0 maps [1]: thus different sized RZs
for similar sized outbreaks may be justified in different parts of the
country. More importantly, this delay would allow for a cost-
benefit analysis and stakeholder consultation, necessary to support
any policy of regionalisation, to be undertaken.
Figure 1. Required Restriction Zone radii to maintain the risk of escape below 1%, given the number of IPs I and the mean
reproduction ratio R0 of all IPs within the zone.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005481.g001
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transmission kernel. A number of transmission kernels for
individual farm-to-farm transmissions have been published for
outbreaks such as that in the UK in 2001, including a historic
kernel [1] limiting all transmissions to the furthest recorded in
2001 (i.e. below 60 km), and an extended kernel [12], limiting
transmission to below 80 km (though this latter kernel was not
designed to incorporate airborne spread). Clearly, using either of
these kernels would result in RZs of radius 60 km and 80 km,
respectively. Moreover, they would predict that the risk of escape
from the RZ was zero. Consequently, using a fitted distribution (as
was the case in this study) yields a more conservative estimate for
the radius of the RZ, because such an approach allows for low
probability, long-distance transmission events.
In comparison with distributions based directly on published
historic kernels [1] or extended kernels [12] the model probability
distribution generates the intermediate value for transmission
beyond r from below 4 km up to beyond 50 km (figure 3). The
historic kernel restricts all transmissions to the furthest recorded
distances, below 60 km, while the extended does not allow for
transmissions beyond 80 km. Only 0.39% of transmissions occur
above 50 km (model), as opposed to 1.4% (historic) and 0.016%
(extended) respectively.
It is difficult to say what effect the application of RZs would
have had on past outbreaks since epidemics are highly dynamic,
making the timing of actions critical. Nevertheless, for outbreaks
with long tail end periods, such as that in the UK in 2001, which
are highly localised, a regional policy offers a clear intermediary
step between a national ban and complete relaxation of rules
outside of CZs. Given that transmissions from known IPs during
the 2007 UK outbreak occurred during the times that a national
movement ban was in place it is unlikely that a RZ policy alone
would have affected the course of the epidemic. Evaluation of the
expected risks of transmission under such conditions could,
however, have informed the formulation of Control and/or
Surveillance Zones beyond the mandatory 10 km. The imposition
of a 40 km zone around the initial cluster, designed to capture all
subsequent transmission with 99% probability, would have
contained all ensuing IPs. As a SZ this should have led to the
detection of the second cluster prior to any relaxation of
restrictions (although this would also have generated a substantial
increase in the amount of serosurveillance required); as a RZ it
could have been kept in place for some time after the national
movement ban had been lifted.
Because the model only relies on epidemiological abstractions it
can, in theory at least, be easily applied to other diseases. In
practice, however, we are limited by requiring a good under-
standing of both the transmission distribution and the basic
reproductive number of sources, as provided for foot-and-mouth
in the UK by the 2001 outbreak.
In any future outbreak, in the EU at least, the use of vaccination
will be considered as part of any control and eradication
programme. This will most likely take the form of reactive (local)
vaccination, although there is still a debate over what the best
protocol would be [13,14,15]. While the implementation of RZs as
opposed to a national movement ban is unlikely to require
additional resources, it is also important that such a policy does not
conflict with other control measures. Results given here have
Figure 2. Suggested Restriction Zones with an escape risk of less than 1% and 0.1%, following the Foot-and-Mouth outbreak in the
UK in 2007 (based on a predicted mean basic reproduction ratio).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005481.g002
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CZs and SZs. Comparison with suggested optimal vaccination
zones (VZs) – based on resource limitations - show that these
would also be within any RZ with an escape probability of 1% or
less: for example, for all the different vaccination strategies
considered by [13] the 95% confidence limit for the optimal ring
size radius was always below 23 km (c.f. Figure 1). The only
exception to this is the suggested strategy of vaccinating at capacity
regardless of the outbreak size, prioritising farms purely by
proximity to existing IPs, which means that there is no limit to the
distance at which vaccination occurs. It is difficult to see how or
why this policy would be adopted in practice, if only for trade
considerations, without the establishment of regions from which
exports were prohibited and outside of which vaccination would
not be undertaken: something which could be achieved through
the creation of RZs. The definition of RZs is, therefore, completely
compatible with the establishment of VZs as well as CZs and SZs,
and could be used to inform or at least complement them, thereby
helping to minimise subsequent trade restrictions.
While we have considered localised movement bans here, this
should in no way suggest anything but the highest levels of
vigilance and bio-security precautions being adhered to every-
where during an outbreak. The potentially devastating effects if
infection moves to a region where there are no restrictions means
that the implementation of any such policy requires agreement
from all stakeholders, in advance, of what level of risk is
acceptable, weighed against the potential socio-economic benefits:
it is therefore acknowledged that any epidemiological analysis is
only one component of this decision process.
Materials and Methods
The risk of escape from an RZ depends upon the number of IPs
I, the expected transmission rate from an IP (as reflected by R0,
which encompasses factors such as local animal density and
species) and, crucially, the distribution of distances at which such
transmissions might occur (i.e. the transmission kernel).
Transmission kernel
Spread of infection at various distances is likely to be by
different routes, with direct contact or airborne transmission only
possible over shorter distances and movement of fomites, persons
or animals being primarily responsible for longer range transmis-
sions. Often, it is not possible to differentiate the modes of
transmission (even through post-epidemic tracing and analysis)
and, furthermore, there will be a great deal of overlap between
forms especially at the intermediate distances appropriate for RZs.
We therefore describe the relationship between distance and
transmission using a probability-distribution function for the
distance at which a transmission occurs without any assumptions
about the mechanism of transmission (including whether restric-
tions are always adhered to or not): this does not describe a
diffusive process but rather gives the probability of one or more
infectious jumps occurring over a specific distance.
Records for the UK 2001 outbreak indicate that under
movement controls most transmissions occur at a very local level
(within a few km), with very few occurring beyond the range of any
potential RZ [1]. Transmissions over much longer distances have
been recorded, however, including airborne transmission over
water beyond 200 km [16]. Consequently, we need to quantify the
risk of long distance transmissions that are sufficiently rare for
documented outbreaks to provide insufficient historical data. To
allow for the inclusion of such low probability events we apply a
fitted distribution, as opposed to applying historical data directly.
Here we use a simple two-parameter model function for the
transmission kernel kr ðÞ[17]. The probability distribution Kr ðÞ
for the distance r at which a given transmission occurs must be
weighted by the potential number of farms at that distance, which
Figure 3. The probability of a given transmission occurring (left) at a given distance and (right) beyond a specified distance for the
model transmission distributions and those based on the historic transmission kernel [1], and an extended transmission kernel
[12], derived from the 2001 UK outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005481.g003
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describing how the probability of transmission between individual
farms scales with distance we thus set:
Kr ðÞ ~
rk r ðÞ
Ð ?
0
rk r ðÞ dr
:
Parameters for the probability-distribution were derived by
least-squares fitting to the recorded kernel data of [1]: this
empirical kernel is the most appropriate since it separates
transmission distance from farm type and size. Explicitly, the
form of the kernel used is,
Kr ðÞ ~ c{1 ðÞ c{2 ðÞ
r
a2 1z
r
a
   {c
where a~1:836 (95% confidence interval (CI): 1.624, 2.048) and
c~4:165 (95% CI: 3.932, 4.398); here a and c are the kernel off-
set and power respectively and have been fitted to the data of [1].
The kernel is shown in Figure 3.
Basic reproduction number
Estimates for R0 during the 2001 UK outbreak [18,9,19] are
consistent with one another and indicate the values that can be
expected: in the absence of movement restrictions (R0w3); after
imposition of a movement ban (1vR0v2); and following
improved bio-security measures and possible ‘‘burn-out’’ [9]
(R0v1). We would expect the second situation to apply initially
in any future RZ. It is important to consider the virus strain in
any estimate, although we note that the recent Surrey 2007
outbreak (with an expected airborne transmission potential
greater than that of 2001) was contained with the mean R0 kept
at similarly low values [4,3]. This may well reflect changes in
policy and procedure, as well as the scale of the outbreak, but
indicates what might be reasonably expected in the future.
Estimates of R0 for a RZ - the mean reproduction ratio of all IPs
in a RZ - are based on the number of infected holdings (rather
than individual herd or flock sites), since this is used to define an
IP.
Model
Distance-kernels provide data on primary transmissions be-
tween two premises, but transmission over a given distance may
occur in one or more stages. In particular, there may be
undetected cases that may form intermediary steps between an
IP and the boundary of an RZ. In cattle, the time between animals
becoming infectious and showing clinical signs appears to be short
[20,21] so that good surveillance and efficient culling will make a
sequence of multiple undetected IPs highly unlikely (in sheep signs
are less obvious [22] but infectivity is also lower). Consequently,
we consider only primary and secondary transmissions: that is, the
risk of disease escaping the RZ directly from known IPs or via as
yet undetected premises directly infected from a known IP. Under
the imposition of movement restrictions the effects of secondary
and subsequent transmissions on the overall likelihood of
transmission over distances above a few kilometres are very small
in practice, since the probability of one such transmission
occurring, let alone multiple events, is already low.
For an IP with reproduction ratio R and transmission-distance
probability-distribution K the expected transmission probability at
s km is
qs ðÞ ~RK s ðÞ
and the expected number of transmissions occurring above r km is
given by
p1 r ðÞ ~R
ð ?
r
Ks ðÞ ds:
The probability of primary transmission from a circular RZ of
radius r containing I IPs at its centre is
H1 r ðÞ ~1{exp {IR0
ð ?
r
Ks ðÞ ds
0
@
1
A
where R0 is the mean reproduction ratio for all IPs; it is assumed
that all IPs have the same transmission distribution kernel. The
expected number secondary transmissions outside the RZ from
each IP is:
p2 r ðÞ ~R2
ð r
0
Ks ðÞ
ð rzs
r{s
Kt ðÞ
0
@
1{
1
p
arccos
t2zs2{r2
2st
     
dtz
ð ?
rzs
Kt ðÞ dt
1
Ads
zR2
ð ?
r
Ks ðÞ
ð s{r
0
Kt ðÞ dtz
ð szr
s{r
Kt ðÞ
0
@
1{
1
p
arccos
t2zs2{r2
2st
     
dtz
ð ?
szr
Kt ðÞ dt
1
Ads;
the first term refers to secondary transmissions outside the RZ
from a primary transmission inside the RZ; the second to such
transmissions occurring from a primary transmission which is
already outside the RZ. The expression for p2 is derived by
first considering a primary transmission occurring at point A a
distance s from the centre of the RZ, and then considering a
secondary transmission occurring at a point B ad i s t a n c et from
A.I fsvr then A remains inside the RZ and we require
twr{s in order for B to be outside. By considering the
possible location of B as a circle of radius t with centre A,w e
note that B will always be outside the RZ if twrzs.F o r
r{svtvrzs we need to calculate the probability that B will
land outside the RZ as opposed to inside, which, assuming all
directions are equal, is equivalent to the proportion of the
circle which is outside the original RZ disc with radius r.T h i s
fraction is given by h=2p where 2stcos h{ p
2
  
~s2zt2{r2.
Finally we sum over all possible t, weighted by the transmission
distance distribution Kt ðÞ ,a n do v e ra l lp o s s i b l es, weighted by
Ks ðÞ . The calculation for secondary transmissions which occur
from a point A outside of the RZ (i.e. swr) are similar,
although now only if the s{rvtvszr is there a possibility of
B landing back inside the RZ: if t is smaller or larger the
transmission can only under– or over-shoot the RZ respec-
tively.
Movement Restrictions for FMD
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for an individual IP,
h2~1{exp p1zp2 ðÞ
can then be extended to yield H2 r ðÞby considering R0 as above.
For primary transmission only the required RZ radius r for a
given hazard level H1 in terms of the number of IPs I inside the
zone and their mean reproduction ratio R0 is the positive solution
of:
ln 1{H1 ðÞ
IR0
{ 1z
r
a
   1{c
1z
r
a
c{1 ðÞ
  
~0:
For secondary transmission this may be calculated numerically
as a function of H2.
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